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1 Nathalie Luca’s insightful new book takes as its theme the following question: what can
“sects” tell us about the societies in which we live? It is this rather that the religious
movements themselves that catches her attention. This question, however, prompts a
series of others. Luca wants to know why some religious groups are considered to be
sects’ while others escape this appellation. And why is it that the same religious groups–
or at least groups that bear the same name–are received (and so designated) differently in
different societies?
2 For Luca, the key unit of analysis in this respect is the nation state. This focus needs a
word or two of explanation given that many sects operate internationally and that the
nation state itself is increasingly subject to pressures from outside. A good example of the
latter is the growing need for the member states of the European Union to respect EU
legislation regarding religious groups of all kinds. That said, such legislation is adopted
within the framework of the nation state, an entity which has acquired traditions of its
own–traditions that are crucial to a proper understanding of religion. How else can we
account for the marked difference between neighbouring countries such as France or
Britain in their attitudes towards, and treatment of sects? It is quite clear that the nation
state remains a highly significant player.
3 For the sake of the English-speaking readers of this journal,  it is worth outlining the
content  of  Individus  et  pouvoirs  face  aux  sectes in  some  detail  before  offering  some
reflections of my own. Luca starts by outlining her theme, explaining that sects (as she
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understands the term) are essentially a modern phenomenon. Traditionally contrasted
with the more inclusive notion of church’, sects are now seen more as a challenge to the
state–in many ways the secular inheritor of the church. In this sense sects are seen as an
irritation to the process of secularisation in that they compromise the autonomy of states
to make decisions regarding the citizens under their jurisdiction. Members of sects, for
example, may resist the state with regard to financial, political and military obligations–
challenges which more often than not are perceived negatively.
4 The  first  section  of  the  book  explores  these  issues  in  the  European context,  paying
particular attention to the French case. This is hardly a new issue–French intolerance of
sects is well-known–but Luca is particularly well-placed to consider such attitudes in a
comparative perspective. Somewhat provocatively she suggests that the French model is
closer to states that do not always conform to the norms of a Western democracy than it
is  to France’s  European or transatlantic partners,  notably the Anglo-Saxon countries.
Such a  statement  needs,  however,  to  be  interpreted  carefully.  It  is  true  that  recent
legislation in France has been received negatively–i.e. as an affront to religious liberty as
this is normally understood. France, however, possesses an independent judiciary capable
of challenging the state where necessary. That is not always the case elsewhere. In this
sense  there  is  a  crucial  and  qualitative  difference  between France  and  the  parallels
suggested by Luca, notably the Chinese case.
5 Explaining the relative intolerance of the French case is nonetheless important.  Such
an explanation lies in the specificities of French history, in which two quasi-monopolies
confronted each other:  on the one hand the Catholic Church,  with its own claims to
exclusiveness, and on the other the secular state, underpinned by a doctrine of laïcité. The
eventual resolution of this stand-off left no space for small or unconventional religious
groups which are seen, almost, as a challenge to Frenchness, whether this be Catholic or
secular. Specifically, a state that is wary of religion of all kinds, sees the sect as challenge
to financial rectitude, to the freedom of conscience (itself in tension with the freedom of
belief), but above all as a threat to laïcité–the notion that religion must remain strictly in
the private sphere. Some of the attempts to control such groups come perilously close to
infringing the norms of toleration.
6 Rather different are the solutions found in the various European states that surround
France: for example the United Kingdom, Belgium and Germany, all of which exemplify
different  approaches  to  the  sects  and  new  religious  movements.  The  most  obvious
contrast lies however with the United States–the country that worked out its democratic
principles at more or less the same time as France but in a very different way. Broadly
speaking the French Revolution defined itself against religion (specifically the Catholic
Church),  whereas  the  American  Revolution  was  effectively  carried  by  the myriad
Protestant  denominations  that  had arrived–indeed were  still  arriving–in  the  nascent
country. Part of the tension between France and the United States emerges from the fact
that  both claim a degree of  universalism for  their  chosen model  and have difficulty
conceding  that  democracy  can  be  built  in  different  ways,  not  least  with  respect  to
religion.
7 The marked contrast between France and the United States introduces what I consider to
be  the  key  insight  in  Luca’s  book:  that  is  her  articulation of  three  different  models
(philosophies) of national community, all of which approach the question of “sects” in
different ways. The three types are the republican (epitomised by France and China), the
multicultural (epitomised by the United States), and the cultural (exemplified by Japan).
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Each have their advantages and disadvantages and each locate the problem of “sects”
rather differently. The three types are developed in some detail in the core chapters of
this book.
8 I have already outlined the French case. The American model requires similar scrutiny.
Like all modern societies it was built by a multiplicity of individual and group decisions
described at some length in Chapter VI. More precisely the notion of religious liberty–
though enshrined in the foundational documents of the United States and claimed as a
continuing virtue–has not always been applied equally to all religious groups. Catholicism
and Catholic immigrants, for example, were not as readily assimilated as their Protestant
equivalents–a resistance that persisted until the 1960s. Nor is it the case that the United
States has been without its problems regarding sects per se. The tragedy of the Branch
Davidians, following the siege at Waco Texas in 1993, is a case in point.
9 It remains the case, however, that the American model is fundamentally different from
the French one. The former enshrines religious liberty by means of a rigorous separation
of church and state. The latter must not encroach on the former. In France, the reverse is
closer to the truth: the church (or religion per se) must not encroach on the state which is
considered  the  superior  entity.  Different  again  is  the  cultural  model,  in  which  the
community  of  citizens  finds  its  unity  in  a  shared  religious  worldview.  In  this  case,
religious groups that do not share this perspective are considered suspect–a situation
that frequently occurs in the Orthodox countries of Eastern Europe. The example that
Luca develops  at  length,  however,  is  the  Japanese case–noting both the almost  pure
expression of the cultural type in imperial Japan, and its mutations in the subsequent
democracy, much influenced by the presence of the American in the post-war period.
From the point of view of sects or new religious movements, the troublesome case here is
Aum Shinrikyo–a movement which, Luca claims, was left to its own devices for far too
long. This laissez-faire attitude is largely accounted for by American influence.
10 The third section of  Individus  et  pouvoirs  face  aux sectes looks at  these groups from a
transnational  perspective.  Religious  movements–just  like  everything  else–are
increasingly  subject  to  the  flows  and  counter-flows  of  what  English  speakers  term
globalisation (the French prefer their own term: mondialisation). Here the three models
outlined above are seen from a different perspective–they react variously to religious
movements which are coming in from outside. Nation states, from this point of view, are
on the defensive. Equally varied are the religious movements themselves–in terms of both
their  organisation and their  motives.  Luca  deals  first  with  the  “ultra-liberal”  group:
namely the Unification Church and Soka Gakkai. The former, born in Korea, is seen as a
carrier of Americanism in face of the communist threat; the latter as an agent of Japan.
The second group is found primarily in the developing world and have particular appeal
to  those  who  are  excluded  from  economic  success,  though  aspire  to  this.  Here  the
examples include a very varied list: the Full Gospel Church of South Korea, the Universal
Church of the Kingdom of God in Brazil, the Celestial Church of Christ in Nigeria, the very
different forms of religion found in Haiti (including voodoo), and the many and diverse
forms of religious life that compete for attention in Brazil.
11 A short but penetrating conclusion completes the text.  It  is framed by Luca’s central
question: what do sects teach us about our own societies, an approach reminiscent of
that developed  by  James  Beckford  in  Cult  Controversies ( Cult  Controversies.  The  Societal
Response to New Religious Movements, London, Tavistock, 1985)–a synergy that I find very
striking. Specifically, new religious movements (the term preferred by Beckford)–though
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numerically of limited significance–provide us with a powerful lens through which to
view the society of which they are part. By looking at the way that different societies
react  to  new religious  movements  and the controversies  that  they generate,  we can
discover  more  about  the  society  itself.  What,  for  example,  is  regarded as  normal  or
abnormal,  as  acceptable  or  unacceptable,  tolerable  or  intolerable  in  any  given case?
Controversies surrounding new religious movements become, therefore, “the barometers
of changes taking place in a number of different societies” (Beckford 1985: 11)–exactly the
point articulated by Luca.
12 The reverse  is  also  true  for  both  authors:  a  full  understanding  of  the  place  of  new
religious movements in any given society depends as much on the society in question as it
does on the religious movements themselves, and nowhere more so than in France. To
develop this point in more detail, it is helpful to look at Beckford’s book in relation to
David Martin’s General Theory of Secularization (Oxford, Blackwell, 1978). The crucial essay,
the penultimate chapter in Cult Controversies, draws very directly on David Martin’s
classic analysis. Just as the historic churches form different “patterns” across Europe (and
elsewhere)  in terms of  their  modes of  secularisation,  so too do the minority groups,
including new religious movements–and for exactly the same reasons. Particular features
can be identified which have predictable effects both for the process of secularisation and
for the management of innovative or unusual forms of religious life. One such feature is
the state. In France the state assumes a moral quality, becoming itself an actor in the
religious field; no other European society exhibits this tendency to quite the same degree.
Once again, I am struck by the parallels with Luca’s work: the importance of looking at
the social and political context, the links between sects and the process of secularisation,
the primary role of the state, and the need to develop the analysis from a comparative
perspective.
13 It is abundantly clear however that the question of definition bedevils a great deal of this
discussion.  The French prefer  the word “sect”,  the Anglo-Saxons use the term “new
religious movement”.  Are they the same thing? And what  should and should not  be
included  in  this  category?  Luca  addresses  the  second  issue  very  directly,  offering  a
minimalist  definition of  the term:  “la  secte  est  un groupe religieux socialement  non
assimilé et perçu comme menaçant pour la stabilité d’une société donnée (p.102)” [A sect
is a religious group which resists assimilation and is  perceived as threatening to the
stability of a given society.] It follows that any religious group or movement that does not
quite “fit” the society in question can be considered a sect. It is at this point that I find
myself questioning Luca’s approach–a hesitation that leads in turn to my concerns about
the third section of her text (the material on transnational movements). It is not so much
that I have a difficulty with the argument as such; it is more a question of what should or
should be included in a volume concerned primarily with sects.
14 To  be  more  precise,  quite  a  number  of  the  movements  included  in  ChapterIX,  in
particular the Full Gospel Church of South Korea, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of
God in Brazil and the Celestial Church of Christ in Nigeria, are not, in my view, sects at all.
They  are  part  of  the  global  Pentecostal  movement  that  is  growing  exponentially,
particularly in the global South–so much so that they would hard to contain within the
definition set out above. These movements are simply too big to be thought of as sects
and, in some places at least, are becoming part of the religious mainstream. Of course the
lines  of  demarcation are difficult.  It  may well  be  the case that  there are “sects”,  or
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sectarian tendencies, within Pentecostalism just as there are in other religious traditions,
but it is important to be clear about the starting point.
15 But I  repeat:  I  do not dispute the argument as such.  I  entirely agree with Luca that
unusual or counter-cultural forms of religion are of central interest for the sociologist of
religion–indeed for the sociologist tout court. This is so for two reasons. The first is that
they tell us a great deal about the societies of which they are part (the central theme of
Luca’s book). The second is related: in order to understand these movements better, it is
imperative that we see them in context. I am, however, less convinced than Luca that this
argument should be limited to groups that are called sects’, regardless of the definition. It
is equally true for many, very different types of religion.
16 That statement, however, might tell you more about me (a British-trained, pragmatic,
problem-solving  sociologist)  that  it  does  about  this  Luca’s  text,  which  is  beautifully
written by a French-trained, rather more conceptually minded author, who is responding
to a question that continues to preoccupy the French in ways that the British sometimes
find difficult to understand. It is clear that the sociologist, as much as the notion of sect,
is conditioned by her context.
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